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Introduction 
This case collection of three farmers illustrates some of the strategic choices that entrepre-
neurial farmers across Europe are taking. Like many other places, European farmers are
subjected to a thick maze of governmental regulations, restrictions and incentives and, the
need to battle with high labor and real estate costs. At the same time, European farmers
benefit from productive soil conditions, sophisticated customers, well developed food chains
and advanced technologies. European farmers respond to the challenges by professionalizing,
internationalizing, specializing, diversifying, consolidating and moving up in the value chain
– just as any business will do in a changing environment. These entrepreneurs seek to grow
their businesses and try to maximally exploit the opportunities provided by technologies and
markets. If the following farmers are any guide, then the one thing that Europeans farmers
are unlikely to do, is to give up and surrender their industry.
The European version of governmental interference in farming activities is particularly
complicated since it is provided on two levels: on the national level, and on the European
Union level. But again just like anywhere else, this regulatory thicket is under high pressure
to open up in response to the meta-change drivers of global business: globalization,
demographic changes, rising commodity production and the general trend towards free(er)
markets and international trade as enforced by WTO and other bodies. European farmers'
exposure to these meta drivers is therefore becoming more immediate and forceful, and 
they need to identify and utilize their competitive advantages for charting their course 
accordingly. 
The first company illustrated in this case is Landgut Nemt, which dairy and vegetable
producer René Döbelt manages in Saxony in the East of Germany; the second is Anthura
BV, operated by the Dutch flower producers Nic and Iwan van der Knaap; and the third is
Riverford Organic Vegetables Limited, an organic farming cooperative run by Guy Watson
in the South of England.
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Landgut Nemt: 
René Döbelt from Saxony
René Döbelt impatiently passes by his recently completed dairy production facility on the
way to his new office premises on the second floor. His old office consisted of two tiny
rooms right next to the milking stand inside the barn where he also had 600 head of dairy
cattle. In the new office he finally has the space and infrastructure to organize his increas-
ingly complex operations efficiently. 
The completion of the new dairy production facility put a major plank of his strategy into
place: he will now be able to process up to 1000 metric tons of milk per year into a complete
array of dairy products: yoghurts, curds, cheeses, butter, etc. In addition, he is installing a
bakery to produce fresh bakery items. He plans on selling the largest part of what they
produce in direct delivery service to currently 2000 households in the Leipzig area. Once 
up and running, the production facility will take up about 20% of his own overall milk
production as it becomes his fourth main line of business. Döbelt is anxious to launch the
facility and hand it over to a general manager for day to day management, so that he can
turn his attention to initializing business area No 5. To make the deal, he needs to give that
his top attention now. He also recently came back from a high-level fact finding trip as 
part of a delegation visiting Brazilian agribusinesses, and this gave him even more ideas for
the business areas No 6, 7, 8, etc, altogether making him even more impatient to move
ahead. 
The first business: Milk production with 650 cows and 450 calves
René Döbelt is what they call a Wiedereinrichter in Germany – a "re-establisher". Shortly
after German reunification, former farmers of Germany's eastern regions or their heirs were
offered preferential access to capital if they wanted to reestablish a family farm. Since his
mother had been a farmer, he used this route to take over a socialist farm combinat together
with a partner in 1992. At the time the farm had 500 cows and 800 ha of land under culti-
vation. In 1996 the partner left and Döbelt became the sole owner. 
Viewed in retrospect, it turned out that the help provided by the Wiedereinrichter program
was negligible in light of the challenges they had to face to be competitive. The first couple
of years were spent upgrading, or better said, replacing the farm's run down and outworn or
dispersed capital equipment. With investments in new facilities and halving the labor force
to 16, the milk production finally became competitive. On restarting production, Döbelt
switched to organic milk production, becoming the second largest organic milk producer in
the whole eastern part of Germany. At that time he was able to achieve a sufficient price
premium for the organic milk.
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By 2002, the price premium for organic milk production had almost disappeared, so Döbelt
switched back to conventional production. By 2005 he had expanded to 650 milk producing
cows, plus 450 calves. He owns milk quotas for 4000 metric tons of milk per year, which is a
little less than the amount he is producing (see Exhibit 1 for information on the European
milk quota system). With 650 cows, he is one of about 200 German farmers with dairy
farms of that size or larger. 
From benchmarking data provided by private business consultants, Döbelt knows that
managing to get EUR 0.02 per kg of milk as operating income puts him in the bracket of
the 25% most profitable milk producers in the country (see exhibit 4 for productivity data
comparisons). From other data he knows that the best managed single purpose dairy farms
are able to net EUR 0.04 per kg on their milk. Döbelt knows very well where he loses that
additional profit potential: if he would focus on the dairy production himself rather than
hiring a general manager, he could save that GM’s salary and run the dairy on a somewhat
larger scale. These two factors combined would earn about 3 cents per kg of milk.
The current milk quota pricing is the biggest problem he would face if he intended to
expand production. Since 1984 in EU Europe, and since 2001 for the East of Germany,
milk quotas have been tradable property rights. At a recent auction he submitted a price at
which he would earn no profit on the additional milk sold, but the settled price ended up
30% above that. Döbelt knows that whoever bought these rights will make steep losses on
them. However, he also knows that a lot of farmers buy milk rights on a variable cost calcu-
lation only, ignoring the need for capital investment and depreciation. The upshot of this
general pricing behaviour is that on the whole, the dairy industry cannot keep up with
necessary investments, and farms are going out of business at an alarming rate. 
In 2004, the milk business earned EBITDA of 12% on sales of EUR 1.8 million. (See
Exhibits 2 and 3 for detailed financial information on the Döbelt group of companies.)
The second business: vegetable, potato, grain, legume and feed production
on 970 ha mostly adjacent land
Along with the farm for the dairy production, Döbelt had also acquired 800 ha of leased
farming land when he established the business in 1992. Over the years he has expanded his
ownership to 200 ha and has an additional 770 ha under lease contracting, also contracting
produce from 200 ha of other farm land. He has effective control over 1200 ha of land.
In field production, Döbelt has chosen niches through the years. The two niches that he has
developed are organic production and vegetable production. His vegetable and potato fields
are on about one fourth of his land, and they bring half of the sales. He cultivates several
types of vegetables, potatoes, onions, beans, peas, carrots, and beet root in order to manage
the market in a portfolio approach and weather the risks that are associated with vegetables.
He uses 25% of his fields to produce feed for his dairy business, which supply about 10% of
the feed needed by value and 35% by volume. He makes use of 50% of the fields for grain
production (wheat, maize, and triticale).
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The field production earned EBITDA of 21% on sales of EUR 1.45 million in 2004.
Döbelt is concerned that the income ratio has been steadily decreasing over the years – if he
can't turn that trend around, he'll have to change his strategy. One easy exit would be to
switch from niche production to commodity feeds for his own dairy business, and for input
to the biogas plant that he is about to erect. With the biogas plant he will be taking a lot of
the complexity out of his business, because it will integrate all the businesses into a single
value chain and reduce the management task of handling complex crops. 
The third business: JV buy out of an 800 ha farm 130 km away
In 1999 Döbelt bought a 50% share in a combined dairy/field production at an 800 ha farm
some 130 km away. His cash infusion was used to recapitalize the farm and restructure the
business. Shutting down the dairy production, they sold 150 cows (and the milk quota) on
the open market.
The fourth business: Direct sales to Leipzig area households
As early as 1997, Döbelt started a direct selling network for the delivery of milk and farm
produce to households in the region, including customers in the city of Leipzig about 30 km
away. Over the years he has managed to grow the business and is serving 2000 households
with four full time deliverymen. At this size, his company is already one of the largest direct
sales networks in Germany for agricultural produce. The business is hampered, however, by a
few obstacles – mostly that the milk has to be delivered in returnable containers, and that he
can only sell a limited range of products.
In 2004 he bought what in pre-communist times had been the largest farm in the village for
EUR 90,000 – including 26 ha of farm land. Under socialist rule the farming family had
emigrated, and the barns and stables eventually became a storage place for pharmaceuticals.
After reunification the German government agency Treuhandanstalt renovated the buildings
to bring them in line with Western electrical and sanitary standards and returned ownership
to the emigrated family. These had for years tried to sell it on the market for what was
supposed to be its accredited value of EUR 250,000 and they never found a buyer. 
Döbelt took the shell of the building and invested all in all around EUR 1 million to install
his own dairy processing equipment, bakery, street shop and company offices there. Now
equipped with a full range of natural fresh farm produce, dairy and bakery products, and
being the only such supplier in the Leipzig region, he hopes that his direct marketing
business will really take off. Leipzig, a city of 500,000 inhabitants (population of about 
2 million in a 50 km radius) is showing strong economic growth in recent years, with a solid
industrial base in automotive and logistics industries.
René Döbelt's brother is the general manager of the direct sales business, and he owns 
10% of the shares. So far this business has generated EUR 460,000 in sales, with 
9% EBITDA. With the new investments in place, the sales and profits are expected to 
grow at a rapid pace.
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The fifth business: Biogas driven generation of electric power
The German government has been very generous to any kind of electricity generation that is
renewable. In 2004 the second stage of a renewable energy law came into effect, forcing
electricity generators to accept electric power from renewable sources at minimum prices.
These prices act as an income guarantee for anybody installing a wind turbine, a solar plant,
or in fact a biogas plant. The beauty of the law is that the government does not have to pay
for this subsidy – consumers pay for it with higher average electricity costs. However, since
these are not separately shown, and since the utility companies would not want to appear to
be anti-green, the consumers don't really notice the cost of the subsidy. Instead, many
Germans, by some accounts up to 70% of all households, have become part owners in
financial mutual funds specialized in erecting renewable power plants, with above average
returns guaranteed. Therefore, opposition to the law has been minimal. The scheme has been
a superb political success.
The minimum prices stipulated for electric power from biogas facilities had not been attractive
enough for some years, but that changed in 2004 due both to a revision of the law and
improved technologies in the market. Döbelt has calculated that with the power plant proposal
that was offered to him, he could earn a tidy return on his investment, virtually guaranteed
over the next 20 years. Furthermore, he has a natural hedge built into his operations, because
he could use his own land for producing the feedstock material for the power plant. 
Moreover, the brilliant engineer who proposed the plant to him seemed to lack commercial
savvy, especially in contract negotiations and selling. Döbelt offered him a 50/50 joint
venture selling these power plants. Döbelt would be the initial site for installations, and
being a farmer himself, he is sure that he can sell these plants to fellow farmers much more
effectively than this engineer could. If this JV is pulled off right, each plant sold will generate
several hundred thousand euro of net profit.
However, the biogas business will require a lot of Döbelt's attention, in order for it to take
off. He'll need to make sure that his other four businesses largely run on their own. 
Other minor activities
Besides his 5 main businesses described above, Döbelt also owns some minor activities that
don't consume any of his management activity, nor do they materially change his income
position. Together with two other farmers Döbelt owns part of a 240 ha farm with 120 head
of cattle some 80 km away. He also owns 16% of a marketing company selling organic farm
produce in Saxony, and together with a local farmer he owns 50% in a JV storage facility. 
Next businesses
The kind of businesses that Döbelt is strongly interested in could be found a few hundred
kilometers eastward. Polish, and further away also the Ukrainian farms are undercapitalized,
often undermanaged with too little know-how, and in the case of Poland will over the next 
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few years have to come in line with EU agricultural productivity. Döbelt feels that he has all
the know-how he would need to convert ex-socialist, undercapitalized farming operations
into companies fit to operate in the market. The skills for that go beyond the merely
technical and managerial; this is also a question of understanding and guiding the people
attached to the land. He has gone personally through that process, and he feels that he could
leverage his skills in the East. If only he can free up enough time to take a good, long, careful
look, he is certain he would find interesting deals.
The Strategy of Diversification
Döbelt has reconsidered his strategy of diversification over and over again – and he still is
not certain that it was the right thing to do. He knows that he is stretching both himself and
his organisation by running several businesses at once. He knows where he has lost net profit
potential as a result. Despite that, however, he has been outperforming most of his compe-
titors in each of these businesses. He also feels that going forward, there will be more and
very important synergy effects in his portfolio of activities. Certainly one of them is market
risk reduction. The feed production might supply his milk production or the biogas facility,
the milk production can sell both into the commodity market and into the dairy direct
marketing channel, the biogas facility is both customer and supplier to the other businesses,
etc.
Another very important risk consideration made itself all too real in the year 2003, when
Döbelt had to face a serious drought. Reversed, in 2002 parts of his farm land were drowned
in the "flood of the century", when the Elbe and Mulde river system overflowed. In 2001,
there was a near catastrophe of another sort. He had sold grain to a storage warehouse that
only weeks later became contaminated as part of an illegal industrial waste scandal. He
himself had only narrowly escaped having his stored grain confiscated and being involved in
follow-on liabilities. Similarly, in the years before that he had been spared from any trouble
with BSE, partly because he was an organic producer. But he knew too well how many of his
fellow farmers had seen their existences wiped out with the disease. 
Even though he has never been dealt a full blow by disaster in the past years, it would be
plainly naïve to believe that his businesses could be fully immunized to troubles such as
these. Thus it seems to René Döbelt that it is not such a good idea to place all his capital
into a single business activity – it could be destroyed at any moment by an occurrence
completely outside of his control.
A major contributor to success in the past was Döbelt's patience – waiting for the right
moment to do the deal. One experience he made over and over again was that it required
patient but stringent attention to be able to snap up assets at a price below the real value,
and not at the typically absurd levels at which they were openly traded. That was true for his
purchase of the old farm for the dairy production facility, for the expansion of his milk
quotas, purchase or lease of new land, and even the biogas facility. If anything, Döbelt wants
to keep this as a guiding principle for further expanding his business. 
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But would he be able to repeat these successes on entering markets that he did not know so
well? How could he institutionalize his abilities better, and how could he attract more capital
in order to seize opportunities faster when he identified them?
Döbelt had again one of those inner moments of restlessness as he hurried up to his new
office. He wanted to move ahead faster than he had so far, but not so fast that he could trip.
As he opened the door to his office, two gentlemen were sitting there and waiting to talk
with him about some of the next steps in establishing business with the biogas facility. 
He needed to make decisions about the set-up for selling them – whether to be a turnkey
supplier or only the technology supplier, for instance. Döbelt did not have any experience
with these choices, or enough time to reflect on this, nor did he have a business school
education – but none of that had stopped him from being successful in his other businesses.
After all, how different could biogas facilities be? 
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Anthura BV: 
Nic and Iwan van der Knaap in Zuid Holland
As he surveys the future production site for propagation of young anthurium plants after
laying the foundation stone in the Chinese Yunnan Province on this lush August morning,
Nic van der Knaap has many thoughts going through his mind. In several important ways,
this new production site represents a major departure from how his company has progressed
over the past 33 years of breeding and propagating the tropical flower Anthurium. But in
many other ways, this new production plant only represents a different implementation of
the same two strategic principles the company has always followed. These two principles
have served them well in the past: 1) be the most knowledgeable expert in Anthurium flower
breeding, and 2) use this knowledge to achieve total control over every aspect of the business
so that the fruits of that expertise flow into the company and not into someone else's pocket.
One of the major changes which the Chinese production facility involves is that his son 
Iwan v.d. Knaap conceived and implemented this project. He will also be the one to make a
success of it – because in November 2004 Nic v.d. Knaap handed over managerial control of
the company to his two sons, Iwan v.d. Knaap as General Manager and Marc v.d. Knaap as
Production Manager, and as commercial director, Marco van Herk. Back in 1972, when 
Nic v.d. Knaap was 28 years old, his father handed the company over to him, and it had
long been clear that he would do the same with his sons – the time for this handover came
in 2004.
The second major change is that this production facility is the first that the company has
ever installed outside Europe (in Europe they established a German breeding and propa-
gation facility for orchids back in 1995). As of 2004, the company has been selling its
products to clients in well over a hundred countries, ranging from Iceland to Saudi Arabia,
but never had they moved anthurium production outside of Holland before. 
The third major change has been a recognition of the fact that, if the company wanted to
maintain its approximately 70% world wide market share for young anthurium flower
plants, it needed to extend its intellectual property protection scheme to a much higher level.
In the past, it was typically sufficient to own the patents or breeding rights on the flower
varieties and enforce them through strong customer relationships. However, in a market like
China, and increasingly elsewhere, that strategy is no longer sufficient to protect the
business.
Breeding and propagating Anthurium varieties
Nic v.d. Knaap, like his father before him, grew tomatoes and cucumbers in Holland until
1972. In that year, soil disease problems in his hothouses devastated the yields. Unable to
resolve the problem, Nic v.d. Knaap decided to switch to flower propagation instead.
The Dutch flower business was doing very well at that time, profiting from a major recon-
struction of the horticultural industry initiated seven years before by the Dutch government.
There were about 70 anthurium growers in Holland, and one of them was Nic v.d. Knaap's
father-in-law. That is where he found his liking for the Anthurium flower, and by 1973 he
had switched all his production from tomatoes to anthuriums. 
By 1980, anthuriums had gone out of fashion. Prices were depressed and the second oil crisis
had just increased cost of production significantly. Nic v.d. Knaap saved his business with
intense marketing of the flower at fairs, local flower shops, hotels, in lifestyle magazines, etc. 
He developed marketing thrust by creating and providing design ideas to the flower users, in
order to raise overall consumption of this singular and relatively expensive tropical flower. 
In those days of end customer marketing, Nic v.d. Knaap developed his instinctive feel for
what the market wants, and how to develop new markets for different varieties of his flower.
Also, from 1980 onwards, a technology shift brought change to the flower industry.
Professor Pierik had developed a tissue cloning technique for plant propagation at
Wageningen University. Anthurium flowers were the first for which he fine-tuned the
technology, and during the next ten years, anthurium growers had either switched
production from seedling to tissue culture or left the business.
In response to this new technology change, Nic v.d. Knaap revised his business model in
1985. Instead of growing anthurium flowers to full size and auctioning them to customers,
he would focus exclusively on propagating young plants. He would sell the young plants to
growers anywhere in the world, who could sell the flowers at auctions or through direct sales
channels. This move towards young plant production was accompanied and reinforced by 
an unique and invaluable strategic action which he took early on. Nic v.d. Knaap understood
that tissue cloning would very quickly reduce the gene pool diversity of Anthurium varieties,
since growers would only clone popular strains, and would allow the rest to disappear. So he
travelled up and down the country, collecting unpopular or leftover varieties which the
growers did not want to use any longer. This is how he assembled the largest range of
Anthurium flower and pot plant varieties in the industry. A few years later his company,
Anthura BV, could draw on this large gene pool to breed new varieties which they patented.
Effectively introducing this new step of young plant production into the value chain made
sense for the industry for two reasons. First, many growers of the flowers and pot plants were
capable of growing the plant, but might not have the capacity to fully master the tissue
cloning technology. Alternatively, they might master the tissue culture technology, but they
lacked the genetic material from which to clone. Second, transporting the full-grown flowers
was costly and harmful to the flower. The closer the flower could be grown to the actual
place of consumption, the more cost effective the total chain would be. So Anthura began to
concentrate on young plant propagation in Holland, shipping them to grower customers
around the world who finish raising these plants to full size, and then sold them in their
local markets.
To focus on selling young anthurium plants and leveraging the intellectual property rights in
connection with their gene pool has paid off nicely for Anthura BV. In 1990, Anthura BV
had a 25% market share in Holland for Anthurium young plants, facing one competitor of 
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about equal size and a fractured community of other small growers. By the year 2000,
Anthura BV had a close to 90% market share in Holland, with the rest split among hobby
growers and here or there a company that owned some specific varieties. Anthura estimated 
a market share of about 60% outside Holland, both for flower and pot plant production.
The other 40% consisted of a large and diverse group of local growers who only sold a few
specific varieties plus low quality plants, or who in fact bred and sold varieties in violation 
of Anthura's intellectual property rights.
Expansion moves during the 1990s
Since Anthura BV had more or less reached the limits of all that could be achieved in the
worldwide anthurium market, they decided to diversify into another flower market with
similar characteristics. 
In 1995, the company entered the Phalaenopsis flower business to cultivate this orchid. 
The phalaenopsis market was dominated by the company Floriculura almost as completely 
as Anthura dominated anthurium production. Nonetheless, within 10 years of steady
investment and application of their know-how, Anthura BV reached a Dutch market share 
of 15% in 2004, and became established as a strong No 2 in the phalaenopsis market. The
owners of Anthura established Anthura Arndt, the production facility (1.7 hectares) located
in Germany, which is responsible for the breeding and propagation of all of the company's
phalaenopsis plants.
The attractive feature in the phalaenopsis market is that at 32% in 2003/2004, it is growing
much stronger than anthurium sales. So the main problem at both companies is in fact the
struggle to keep up with demand. Still, the orchid business only represented 30% of
Anthura's total business in that period (see Exhibit 5 and Exhibit 6 for gross revenue and
costs of Anthura BV and Exhibit 16 for examples of Anthura produce).
In 2001, the company entered into a marketing agreement with the Corn. Bak BV, a
company that breeds and propagates young bromeliad plants. Anthura did not enter upon
production of these plants, but they could sell propagation material through their worldwide
network. Growers liked obtaining these three tropical plants – Anthurium, orchids and
Bromeliads – from a single source. By entering into the marketing agreement with 
Corn. Bak BV, Anthura could improve client relations with the growers and pick up
additional sales margin in their sales network.
Both of these expansion moves beyond the Anthurium could be judged as successful and
gave the company a multiple set of growth options for the future (see Exhibit 7 for sales
growth). Besides expanding the market for Anthurium flowers and pot plants in various
shapes and channels, they could grow stronger in the orchids business. They could launch
into a third and a fourth tropical flower market, or they could leverage their worldwide sales
network for several additional activities. The company has solid finances and a healthy cash
flow to support further expansion. Nic v.d. Knaap handed a healthy company with attractive
options for further growth and development to his two sons (see Exhibit 8 for facilities and
Exhibit 9 on the Dutch flower market). What will they choose to do?
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Anthura's strategic principle
In each business activity that the company ever entered, Anthura BV has employed the same
strategic principle, which leads them to use all available knowledge to achieve total control
over their business in all stages as much as possible. 
In anthurium propagation that has meant for instance:
• The company continuously develops new varieties and tries to improve old ones. The
large gene pool available to them gives them a natural edge over any potential compe-
tition, as variety breeding is still an affair of 1 hit out of 10,000 tries. Nonetheless, to
keep the lead, Anthura BV has to invest continuously in its intellectual properties.
• The company experiments with every possible aspect of Anthurium breeding and 
propagation in order to achieve a consistently high quality flower: soil compositions,
watering cycles, lighting, temperature, and shipment conditions are constantly controlled,
enhanced and investigated. The company has just developed and patented a new
diaphragm solution for controlling ambient light in the green house. The company's
intellectual property rights and implicit know-how for anthurium growing conditions
have become an increasingly important corollary to the rights on their plant varieties.
Any variety on the market could be easily and illegally copied through tissue cloning, 
but knowing how to grow it right is quite a different challenge, and much harder for the
potential intellectual property violator to achieve. 
• Even though the company is not active in the end customer market itself, a vigorous
watch is kept on the end customer market trends in order to guide the breeding program,
and equally important, the propagation program. Growing a variety to full maturity takes
two years, so in essence the company has to anticipate market demand by variety about 
2 to 3 years ahead. Once that process is set in motion, though, the plant production of 
a variety can neither be increased nor told to stop growing. It requires intensive coordi-
nation with the growers to maintain an even flow of preferred varieties to the end market,
since Anthura is in effect the only significant supplier. If Anthura misjudges the markets
too often, growers might switch to other plant species, and Anthura would lose the
business.
• The company vigorously collects data on every single variety and activity of any of its
competitors in the Netherlands and as much as possible abroad. In Holland, Nic v.d. Knaap
claims, he is well informed about every single square metre of soil where anthuriums grow. 
China
In 2005, 30% of the world's anthurium growers are located in Holland. Anthura sells about
half of its production in Holland, and half in the rest of the world. The Dutch growers once
supplied most of Europe with flowers and pot plants, but that is changing. Iwan v.d. Knaap
expects that in five years' time he will no longer distinguish between Holland and the rest of
the world the way his father did. In the future, Anthura BV will consider the EU as one
market, and the rest of the world as the other. 
Iwan v.d. Knaap also expects most of their growth to come from the overseas markets, with
China leading the way, although there are many other markets as well. 
However, the growth in China presents two challenges to Anthura BV: 
1. Intellectual property rights on ornamental plant varieties are either nonexistent or
difficult to enforce there, and the Anthura BV executives expect that this will remain so
for several years to come.
2. Plants that are shipped from abroad are considerably more expensive than those produced
locally based on local propagation material. 
The younger and the smaller the shipped plants are, the less expensive are shipping costs.
The solution is therefore to install a young plant propagation facility in China. The Dutch
facilities will ship plants that are only a few weeks old to the Chinese facility to be grown for 
12 months before being sold to the final growers for the last growth phase, which takes
another 12 months (see Exhibit 17 for the growth stages of Anthurium plants).
By controlling the flower growing stage in their own production facility inside China,
Anthura BV can ensure that their expertise in the production of high quality anthurium
flowers is applied to the flower in a cost efficient manner, while not giving anything away 
to potential competitors. This should make it possible to provide high quality flowers at
competitive prices for the Chinese market. Some growers will always violate intellectual
rights on the varieties. But they will be missing the second key ingredient of this knowledge:
how to grow the plant under optimal conditions towards optimal quality. Over the long 
run, Iwan v.d. Knaap hopes it will make more sense for growers to enter into respectable
customer relationships with Anthura BV and buy the young plants from them, along with
the intellectual property rights. 
That at least is the plan. Both Iwan and Nic v.d. Knaap have no illusions about the Chinese
market. To establish a market for Anthura in China will neither be easy nor will it go fast,
and the effort will divert a great amount of management attention from their home base.
However, Iwan v.d. Knaap feels that he would rather attack the Chinese challenge head on
than wait until the Asian market takes off without Anthura and eventually arrives back home
to attack him. He is totally committed to maintaining the dominant position that Anthura
BV has in the worldwide Anthurium ornamental market. He is not going to let it slip away,
either now or later, not yielding to the Chinese or any others. 
So on this August morning in 2005, Nic v.d. Knaap sighs as he turns his eyes from the new
production site back to where his son stands amidst the Chinese. He knows that his son
Iwan v.d. Knaap has his work cut out for him. Wanting to continue a proven strategy of
absolute control is one thing, executing that strategy on a worldwide scale with the resources
of a small scale business is quite another. That will be the work of a new generation, he
thinks. Whether his sigh is one of relief or concern, only Nic v.d. Knaap knows. 
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Appendix
Outlook for the Dutch flower industry in the coming decade
Out of every ten flowers that cross a national
border somewhere in the world, 7 originated in
the Netherlands – a very impressive market
share. The next largest exporter of flowers in
the world is Colombia, with less than 1 in 10
flowers (0.7 to be precise). 
In 2004 the Netherlands produced EUR 4.7
billion worth of ornamentals, and exported
ornamentals worth EUR 5.9 billion. The imports
are typically sold at the auctions, then repacked
and exported again. That illustrates two well
developed competencies of the Dutch people –
their meticulous care of a huge production on
every square centimetre of valuable soil, and the
high degree of competence they have developed
in trade. The Dutch have been practicing trade
since the sixteenth century. But, as anyone in the
Netherlands will hurry to say, successes of the
past are no guarantee for the future. 
Role of the Dutch auction system 
Looking at the past, it is obvious that the
invention of the auction system as a market-
place owned by the growers of fresh produce
allowed for this enormous development in the
market for ornamentals. The rise of hothouse
production goes on the account of a strong
drive for innovative agricultural and horti-
cultural growing techniques. 
In the fruit and vegetable business a similar
system of auctions existed all through the
twentieth century, but it collapsed as the outlets
merged into fewer and fewer retail chains. In
the ornamental sector the same change is under
way, but not at the same rate. It is slower, and
many Dutch growers refuse to acknowledge
that there is such a trend at all. 
Changes in Dutch hothouse economy
Nonetheless, these developments are indicative
of the ongoing changes, most notably of scale
enhancement. Hothouses smaller than 2
hectares in area have been disappearing, and
the number of those larger than 5 hectares has
increased in the last 5 years (LEI data). So the
number of companies is diminishing, while
total production is rising. At the same time the
competitors from countries close to the
equator, such as Kenya, Uganda, Ecuador and
Mexico, are growing stronger. Their labor is
cheap and they can produce at about 2000 m
above sea level the entire year round with no
essential seasonal climate change or significant
technical investments. 
The Dutch flower industry is holding on to its
competitive edge with the development of new,
mechanised growing and harvesting techniques
that allow for year-round production at
minimal labor costs, while maintaining very
high quality standards. At latitude of 52º, it is
necessary to have heating in the hothouses for
at least half of the year. With the enormous rise
in the cost of energy, including the natural gas
they use, it is mandatory to reduce the energy
input in hothouse production. At the moment,
experiments are running that use an under-
ground aquifer to store excess heat in the
summer and use that heat in the winter. At
present, this method brings a 30% reduction in
energy use with a 20% increase in production. 
However, ideas to improve the system so that it
can produce excess energy (dubbed "the Energy
Producing Greenhouse") are also under
development. At the same time, walking plant
systems are being developed, which rotate
plants through the hothouse, taking them
through segregated compartments where
different climactic conditions prevail. 
Computer vision programs coupled to camera
systems decide which treatment the plants should
get in order to deliver the right plants at the right
moment. This saves expensive hothouse space,
since there is no more need for paths between the
plants for people to move through for visual
inspection. The plants are brought to the people 
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for harvesting and treatments instead. This
saves labor and allows for the coming use of
harvesting robots, so that in future, labor costs
will be cut to an absolute minimum. 
In answer to environmental restraints the
government places on production, all resources
are used in closed loops and wherever possible
recycled. In fully closed hothouses with
minimum human intervention, no airborne
pests can enter and agro-chemicals will no
longer be used. 
The financing of enterprises such as envisaged
here is a great obstacle as they become more
and more capital intensive. It is becoming
impossible to do this on a small scale, the
consequence of which is that investments go to
larger and larger companies. At the same time
the growers of fresh produce see their opportu-
nities in a forward movement into the supply
chain. This implies that they also try to create
more and more added value, eliminating the
middle man between them and the final outlet
servicing the consumer, cutting costs as well.
From this image we can conclude that the
future Dutch ornamental producing company
will be very large scale, producing year-round
high quality material in direct demand of the
retail outlet. It will do this with a minimum of
labor input and extremely high resource
efficiency in an environmentally friendly way.
These companies will be financed and run like
any modern industry. Once the development is
saturated on the level of resource and labor
efficiency, the companies will eventually leave 
the Netherlands or at least position themselves 
in locations where the other conditions for
production and trade are optimal. This process
may take 10 to 15 years or more.
Olaf van Kooten, professor of horticulture,
Wageningen University, The Netherlands
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Riverford Organic Vegetables Limited
Guy Watson, owner and managing director of Riverford Organic Vegetables Limited
(Riverford, or the Company) took his boots off and leaned back in his chair. So far, in terms
of revenues, 2005 has been an unbeatable year, and this on the back of an outstanding year
2004 (see Exhibit 10) when gross profits increased to 48% from 45%, net profits increased
from 3.3% to 4.7% and EBIT reached 13%. The Company even won the prestigious
Organic Business of the Year award. What now? Guy Watson faced some big challenges,
going forward.
Riverford is the largest distributor of organic vegetable boxes in the South of England, and
one of the largest independent growers nationally. Box sales have been growing at 1000 per
month, already exceeding the targets for 2005 (see Exhibit 11). The active customer count is
soaring, with more than 10,000 customers buying regularly. The net profit per box has also
risen in the past 12 months to almost 10% (company estimate). 
The Company is neither short of potential distribution franchisees nor of national distri-
butors and growers wanting to be a part of Riverford's successful business model. The
message from consumers is clear and positive, too. They want good, fresh (local) food, and
Riverford is producing and delivering just that. More than 1000 new customers are signing
up each month, confirming the interpretation of IGD data in March 2005 which showed
that 96% of UK consumers believe it is important to have a wide variety of food grown right
there in England. Of that high majority, 69% even say it is very important to them1.
Managing the growth
Now Watson is faced with some big decisions about how to lead the Company from here on.
Given the strong evidence of consumer demand, there is considerable scope for growth
across the UK and possibly abroad. A joint venture strategy has been established and is
operating successfully in the East Midlands, where alongside an existing family run business,
the Riverford model has been successfully replicated as River Nene Organic Vegetables Limited. 
How many times can this replication be done successfully? How big can Riverford become
without losing the ethos and culture that drives it, and without over extending the existing
management team, who in general lack formal training, skills development and coaching? 
Watson holds all the pieces of the business together, leading from the front, and he is used to 
1 Data produced in March 2005 from The Institute of Grocery Distribution 
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exerting considerable control, particularly over the details. How would he personally adapt to
the proposed strategy of joint venturing with other companies in other geographies in order
to grow?
Performance in a more competitive environment
How would Riverford fare as competition increased? Only that week, customers were telling
those delivering the boxes that Dairy Crest, one of the UK's largest doorstep milk delivery
companies, would be delivering organic vegetable boxes with their milk at a competitive
price (see Exhibit 12: comparative price data). Internally, they are seeing evidence that
consumer behaviour is changing, because the ratio of 8 orders per week from 10 active
customers has decreased to 5 orders per 10 customers2. Even allowing for the seasonal 
variations of summer holidays, the decline is worrisome. With every box contributing 
some £2.15 to overheads in 2005, keeping volumes up is essential. 
Could Riverford realistically expect to continue to "pick one day, deliver the next"3 if they
operated nationally? Would they be able to offer such a flexible service to their customers –
which currently enables weekly or fortnightly ordering, weekly, fortnightly or "other" delivery
and up to the last minute quantity alterations both on line and on the telephone? Watson is
focused on the threat, constantly seeking to find new, better and cheaper ways of doing
business and keeping overheads as low as possible.
History
Guy Watson started renting and farming 3 acres of his father's farm at Staverton in South
Devon in 1984 with a conviction that good, fresh, affordable food should be available to
everyone. He didn't see farming as "the difficult bit" of the food business but rather felt that
significant value could be generated in putting all the pieces of a supply chain together from
grower to consumer. He ran the whole operation himself, growing, marketing and delivering
vegetables to local shops and restaurants throughout the region. It was hard work, with days
beginning at 0500 and regularly finishing at 2300, but Watson's belief in what customers
wanted, his ability to grow it and to deliver it "to the door" bore good early results, and his
cash driven enterprise made a profit of £6,000 in the first year.
Growing organic
The decision to grow and market vegetables organically could be more than justified
commercially as Watson established his business: despite the risks associated with producing
a crop organically, the marketplace returns were higher than for conventional crops, and he
converted to organic status early. It was, however, primarily a decision based on hours spent 
2 Company data
3 www.riverford.co.uk
European Food and Agribusiness Seminar
Landgut Nemt, Anthura BV and Riverford Ltd
17
in the fields observing, learning and constantly questioning. Watson had decided early in his
life, as he put it, "I don't like using the chemical stuff." Trying new approaches and watching
and 'listening' to the effects on the crop, the soil and the adjacent flora and fauna, and
perhaps even more importantly, by regularly not doing anything at all, he developed a very
deep conviction that farming organically is the only sustainable way to produce food.
A confident approach
The challenges involved in opportunities for growth in the summer of 2005 heralded a new
stage in the life of the Company, and these were more welcome than those they had faced
and overcome before. It was in 1993 for example that Guy Watson took the call from
Safeway in his vegetable packing shed and smiled broadly as he received the news that he
had been waiting for: the supermarket giant wanted his organic vegetables. Having received
the good news and then asking if he could meet the buyer in London on Friday rather than
Thursday, the telephone line went dead. He quickly dialed the buyer's number…"sorry, I
don't know what happened there, but the line was cut…".
"I know why," was the terse reply. "No, Sonny, when we whistle, you jump. Either you are up
here on Thursday or there is no meeting."
There was no meeting. Watson, incensed by the arrogance and values demonstrated by
Safeway's buyer, decided at that very moment to develop his business without the super-
markets. His vision was to make good, fresh, affordable food available to as many people 
as possible by matching the efficiencies of the supermarket supply chain. His vegetable 
box scheme – delivering vegetables direct to farm shops and consumer homes – was 
realising that vision exactly, if only on a small scale. He decided to increase his focus on his
direct-to-consumer business. 
Watson's reaction to the attitude of the supermarkets summarized his approach to life in
general and the food production business in particular: "Why Not?!" His quick decision
proved to be a savvy one. In ten years, Riverford became the largest independent grower of
organic vegetables in the South West of England, and one of the largest distributors of
vegetable boxes on a national scale (Exhibit 13).
There are lots of different ways to get around problems 
The Company has no frills. There is a universal understanding about what creates value and
what creates cost, and new ideas are scrutinized in immense detail in those terms. If the
proposal adds value to the quality, choice and freshness of what is offered to the customers,
or if it increases the number of customers that can be reached, then Riverford will invest
heavily. Otherwise, they won’t – a fact that some potential professional advisors have failed to
understand. 
Once a proposal becomes a reality, it is broken down into its component parts and examined
in detail. The important pieces are turned into procedures to be repeated over and over 
again. With these 'bones' in place, and Riverford's ethos running through the veins of the
Company, Watson can manage his team in a relaxed way, giving individuals significant
responsibility. There are 5 core pieces to the Company: the growers, the pack-house, the
franchise distribution agreements, the shared IT system, and the administrative processes. The
value creators are the product, the people, the pack-house, marketing, and the company ethos.
The right (and good) people 
Riverford is an attractive and popular place to work in the South Hams. Watson has
collected an extremely capable team around him. To date, he has not had to pay too much
for those capabilities. Managers are only paid the local market rate. They tend to be under-
qualified for their positions, but produce outstanding levels of performance. They rarely
leave the Company and all are united in their pursuit of the Riverford vision. Similarly, 
non-managers are only offered the marketplace average on an hourly basis, but demonstrate
absolute conviction in the worth of their work and take huge pride in the Company. Their
outdoor work is hard and manual. The indoor work environment is basic, but all employees
have access to an exceptional canteen where meals of the highest culinary standards are
produced daily. All are extremely positive about how they are rewarded.
Production: farming is not the difficult bit
Although Watson is an agriculturalist by training, and takes every opportunity he can to
walk the fields, he spends very little time growing. With an excellent farm manager (with
green fingers!) and a well-structured grower co-operative in place (formed in 1997), there are
some 13 family run farms in South Devon who share their machinery, labour and knowledge
and grow 85 different varieties of vegetables in order to secure supply agreements to fill the
boxes, so he no longer needs to focus on planting and growing crops. He comments:
"I can make assumptions about the value creating potential of this asset (the land) that
I can't make about any other asset utilized in the business: providing you don't lose the
hands-on connection with the soil, providing you respect it and are gentle with it, you
can rely on it and use valuable management time on other parts of the business." 
In any case, he has to focus on running the business overall: in 2000, for example, the
company grew too quickly, and Watson was almost running others' farms for them as he
taught neighbours how to grow crops well organically. This took his eye off the company 
as a whole and the financial results reflected that. Today, the co-operative benefits from
Riverford's knowledge and experience in growing fresh produce, and the risks have been
significantly reduced with better access to the markets. 
Operations in the packing shed, co-located with the main offices of the Company are the
domain of a young production manager running a very tight ship. Success here depends on
an excellent working relationship between the distribution manager and the production
manager, powerful relationships between Riverford and its growers across the UK and
Europe, and a hands-on approach to solving supply problems as they (unexpectedly) occur. 
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Time to make decisions is limited, but it is in the packing shed and the distribution hubs
that profits are won or lost. Riverford's future depends upon the quality and freshness of the
vegetables coming in for packing, and as volumes increase, the stakes are higher, as the
production manager has to source and substitute ever larger quantities of one vegetable for
another. 
Marketing
Riverford has a leading position over competitors in the marketplace. The boxes they offer to
the customer with fresher, better quality vegetables and more choice match or beat those
listed by competitors (see Exhibit 14). This approach is driven by the need to be cost focused
in a commodity based business, and by Watson's personal skill for identifying the main
drivers of value, breaking down those parts into very small pieces so that he completely
understands them, and then controlling them and repeating them relentlessly. 
In terms of marketing, however, knowledge of those who eat the food and what they want
has driven the good results. Riverford has not spent much on professional marketing advice,
but with the help of a designer who truly understands and believes in the ethos of the
Company, they have established an effective and recognizable brand: the copy is all produced
on unbleached recycled paper written in simple language and with clear, easy to use designs
(see Exhibit 15). Another effective marketing tool has been the weekly newsletter written by
Watson himself and with recipes that he often creates himself. Customer feedback suggests
that this adds huge value to the product, especially for people who may be using some of the
vegetables for the first time and do not know how to prepare them. 
Customers buying a Riverford vegetable box are buying a fresh, simple, practical product and
a transparent production process. They are also buying a piece of Guy Watson's vision: the
'packaging' reflects and indeed encourages that approach. In 2005, over 80% of Riverford's
profit contribution will be generated by direct-to-consumer vegetable boxes. 
Distribution - Delivering to the customer 
Distribution of Riverford's vegetable boxes around the country is carried out by franchisees
who pay EUR 30,000 for the licensing rights to become a distributor. After paying Riverford
an on-going management fee of 3% of turnover, they realize an average gross margin of
23%. The cost of distribution per box "from soil to franchisee" is 9% of the total cost of
goods, all of which is co-coordinated and managed by the distribution manager, who also
runs his operation as his own business. In this way, both the risks and the rewards are shared
between Riverford and the entrepreneurs that own and operate the distribution businesses,
and most of the highly depreciable assets associated with distribution (trucks, vans etc) are
kept off the balance sheet. 
The franchising agreements reflect an attempt to keep day to day business management as
simple as possible. This is achieved by taking an enormous amount of time selecting the
franchisees and structuring the agreements in the first place. Franchisees are self employed. 
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Only entrepreneurial candidates may apply and there are plenty of them, with a waiting list
of potential new candidates almost always available. 
The future for Riverford Farms
The core assets for Riverford going forward are the very solid supply base, the people, and
the Company's culture. Their competitive advantages are the quality and freshness of their
product, low overhead and administration costs, and the efficiency and integrity of the
supply chain. 
The future strategy is a simple one to describe: "to multiply the network up around the regions
so there will be 6–8 Riverford models across the country". 
The performance is good, the future is full of potential, and locally at least, the marketplace
is confident that Guy Watson has built a profitable, sustainable company selling good food
at good prices. 
He has all to fight for, but for now it's lunch time. He puts his boots back on and walks out
to his "field kitchen", a beautiful ecologically sound building on the farm designed and
operating as a restaurant which has taken some 7 years to complete – the jewel in the crown.
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1 The European milk quota system
The milk quotas system, with member states
being allocated national quotas, was introduced
by the European Community on 2 April 1984 
as a means of curbing excess production and
reducing expenditure on the disposal of surplus
milk and milk products. At that time, expendi-
ture on support in the dairy sector had reached
5.2 billion ECU or around 30% of the total
agriculture budget. 
There are two types of quota – wholesale and
direct sales. Under the system, if production of
either or both types is above the national quota,
producers who have exceeded their individual
quotas are liable to pay a punitive levy on their
over-production after the end of the quota year.
The levy collected is used to offset the cost of
storing and disposing of surplus milk within the
European Community. The levy is set, per 100
kg of milk, at EUR 33.27 for the 2004/05 quota
year, EUR 30.91 for 2005/06, EUR 28.54 for
2006/07 and EUR 27.83 for the period 2007/08
and thereafter.
Types of Milk Quota
The wholesale quota is held by milk producers
who deliver milk (the produce of the milking 
of cows) to a purchaser (generally a dairy or 
intermediary co-operative with which the 
producer's quota is registered). The direct sales
quota is held by producers who sell their milk
directly to the market without going through a
purchaser, or who sell products other than milk,
e.g. skimmed milk, cream, butter, yoghurt and
cheese. Producers can hold one or both types of
quota. 
Both types of quota are, in principle, attached to
the holding which means that the quota remains
with the land even when the landowner moves.
Levy, Trading and Conversion of Quota
The milk quota year runs from 1 April to 
31 March. If a wholesale producer's deliveries of
milk exceed his quota and a nation goes above its
national wholesale quota, he is liable to pay a levy
on his over-production. Producers can reduce
their levy liability by cutting back production or
by buying, leasing or converting quota to cover
their extra production. Producers can thus
transfer quota in or out to match production.
The price of transactions is determined by the
market. Producers can convert their wholesale
quota into direct sales quota or vice versa to
reflect their actual production. Conversions can
be either permanent or temporary. Producers may
not convert quota that they have already leased
out or produced against.
Source: EU
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22 Financial Data of the Döbelt companies
in Euro 2004 Business 1 Business 2 Business 4 Other businesses
Milk production and feed Vegetable and dairy Direct sales and holding 
Total Sales 1.796.927 1.456.849 466.068 
Materials* -1.110.325 -529.573 -235.956 
Personnel -324.996 -287.338 -150.815 
Depreciation -124.693 -85.112 -17.709 
Other costs -145.061 -335.630 -36.176 
Financing costs* -110.379 -57.009 -5.635 
Net Income -18.529 162.187 19.778 
EBITDA 216.543 304.308 43.122 
EBITDA/Sales 12% 21% 9%
Estimated Value 5.413.000 2.306.000 850.000 1.554.650
Debt Position 2.025.000 593.000 330.000 759.440
Net Value 3.388.000 1.713.000 520.000 795.210
Exhibit x xxxxxxxxxxxxx3 History and projections of key financial data for 
Döbelt companies
Reporting Years 2000/01   2001/02   2002/03   2003/04   2004/05   2005/06   2006/07
Net Profit in EUR 372.685   440.007   432.506   352.827   571.722   597.260   557.177  
Utilization of long term in % 208% 66% 384% 163% 112% 101% 118%
credit volume
Utilization of medium in % 136% 57% 125% 126% 96% 83% 92%
term credit volume
Utilization of short term in % 90% 54% 112% 114% 90% 76% 82%
credit volume
Total Sales 2.892.328   3.958.102   3.818.457   3.655.070   4.007.488   4.089.504   4.056.769  
Profitability in % 12,9% 11,1% 11,3% 9,7% 14,3% 14,6% 13,7%
Cash flow in EUR 226.344   513.551   175.761   315.435   532.118   511.052   469.831  
Total debts 1.588.388   1.594.923   1.426.538   1.105.664   809.118  
* including calculatory costs for owned assets
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4 Productivity data comparisons of Landgut Nemt
Rene Döbelt (2000/01--2003/04) Best Practice 
top 25% 
of group
Capacity   2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 25%+
# dairy cattle 600   500   452   463   509   529   
Quota 3.979.711   3.531.152   3.776.835   3.776.835   4.251.357   3.435.832   
Milk 4% fat 3.900.117   3.569.406   2.983.901   3.504.134   4.262.234   4.329.148   
Reporting Year 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 25%+
Performance in €cent/kilo milk
Milk Sales 38,5   35,9   30,7   30,0   33,2   
Cattle Sales 4,0   13,1   11,7   8,5   3,6   
Cattle Purchases 2,9   14,6   9,0   8,4   3,9   
Other income 2,2   8,9   3,4   4,3   2,1   
Total Income 41,8   43,3   36,8   34,3   35,0   
Total Costs 45,0   45,8   36,6   34,1   31,7   
Calculatory Income -3,2   -2,5   0,2   0,2   3,3   
plus implicit quota return 3,5   2,9   1,9   1,3   3,1   
Company net profit 0,4   0,4   2,2   1,5   6,4
Direct Animal Costs 5,6   6,5   5,6   4,2   3,5   
Base Feed Costs 8,4   7,0   5,0   4,3   5,6   
Supplements feed costs 0,8   0,7   0,8   0,6   0,6   
Concentrate feed costs 11,9   12,5   7,3   8,3   5,7   
Sum feed costs 21,1   20,2   13,0   13,2   11,9   
Labor costs 9,5   10,6   11,0   10,5   9,1   
Barn and buildings 4,5   4,4   4,3   4,3   3,1   
Overhead 0,7   1,1   0,7   0,6   1,2   
Quota 3,5   2,9   1,9   1,3   3,1   
Total Costs 45,0   45,8   36,6   34,1   31,7
Exhibit x xxxxxxxxxxxxx5 Composition of gross revenue of Anthura BV 
by products in 2004
Product Gross revenue (€) Distribution of revenue
Anthurium cutflowers 8 000 000 27%
Anthurium potflowers 11 500 000 38%
Orchids 9 000 000 30%
Bromeliads 1000 000 3%
Others 500 000 2%
Total 30 000 000 100%
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6 Anthura BV cost accounting 
Accounting entry Distribution
Purchase plant material 15%
Energy 9%
Base materials 7%
Labor 39%
Amortization 10%
Housing 3%
Direct sale 5%
Plant breeding 2%
Immediate costs 2%
General costs 3%
Interest 5%
Total 100%
Exhibit x xxxxxxxxxxxxx8 Hectarage (acreage) and composition of work force 
of Anthura BV in 2004
Total 160 employees hothouses 14 ha (35 acres)
Anthura Breeding investigations into and development of new varieties breeding hothouse 2.2 ha (5.5 acres)
Anthura Laboratory propagation (tissue culture) of Anthurium and Phalaenopsis in-vitro laboratory 0.3 ha (0.75 acres)
Anthura Microplants all plants are hardened and sorted here; preparation of hothouse 2.8 ha (7 acres)
shipments of micro-cuttings and plugs 
Anthura Production completely automated and robotized young plant "factory" hothouse 7 ha (17 acres)
Anthura Flower testing and inspection of new and existing Anthurium hothouse 1.6 ha (4 acres)
varieties for the cut flower culture 
Anthura Arndt breeding and propagation of Phalaenopsis plants hothouse 1.7 ha (4.2 acres)
Exhibit 7 Total sales Anthura BV from 1994 - 2004
Year Sales (€) 
1994 5 000 000 
1995 6 000 000 
1996 7 500 000 
1997 8 000 000 
1998 9 500 000 
1999 14 500 000 
2000 15 500 000 
2001 17 500 000 
2002 20 000 000 
2003 25 000 000 
2004 30 000 000 
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9 Dutch flower market by variety
Dutch flower market (auctions)  Sales and change compared to 2003
Cut flowers 2004 Revenue % change Supply % change Price / piece Price / piece 
(€000) (x1000) 2004 (€) 2003 (€)
Rosa 705 942   3.6 3 464 237 1.90 0 21 0 20
Chrysanthemum 285 328   -4.6 1 447 521 2.10 0 20 0 21
Tulipa 184 959   -0.5 1 438 435 9.70 0 13 0 14
Lilium 158 331   -1.0 413 919 4.10 0 39 0 41
Gerbera 115 904   9.5 752 985 -2.30 0 16 0 14
Cymbidium 65 217   -0.8 32 736 1.10 1 99 2 03
Freesia 59 616   -1.0 446 920 5.20 0 13 0 14
Anthurium 39 722   -6.8 69 576 8.20 0 58 0 67
Chrysanthemum GE 38 859   3.0 108 833 15.0 0 36 0 40
Total 2 329 575   0.0 11 847 084 1.50 0 20 0 20
Exhibit 10 Riverford Ltd - Summary income statements (£000)
1988 1992 1993 1997 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005
Sales 38 113 137 730 1109 2991 3660 5400 10 000
Cost of sales 136 216 1488 1816 2800
Gross profit 594 892 1503 1844 2600
Distribution 13.5 11 442 786 169 262 474
Operating profit 288 287 317
Net profit 4.4 15.5 26.8 178 291 203 208 256 600 
Source: Company Accounts 
Exhibit 11 Riverford Ltd - Number of vegetable boxes 
produced weekly
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 07/2005 2005E 2007B
Number of boxes 3700 4200 5000 6500 11 500 22 500 30 000 33 000
Source: Company Data
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Exhibit x xxxxxxxxxxxxxExhibit x13 Distribution areas for Riverford Organic Vegetables 
in the UK (from www.riverford.co.uk)
Although we don’t deliver in these areas at the moment, we will be soon, so please register your details
with us above by entering your postcode in the box above and we will write to you when we are in 
your area.
12 U.K. market - Vegetable box comparisons 20 August 2005
Company Box contents Price 
Organics - 4u.co.uk New potatoes, baking potatoes, carrots, broccoli, cabbage, sweet potato, leeks, red onion, £28.95
kohl rabbi, fennel, beet root, turnip, radishes, celery, lettuce, tomatoes, cucumber, 
peppers, mushrooms, courgettes, 2 varieties of apples, kiwi, melon, bananas, oranges
West country organics Hispi cabbage, bunch turnip, broccoli, courgettes, green onion, lettuce, £14.20
Swiss chard, new potatoes, fresh basil, globe artichoke, tomatoes, bunched carrots
Abel and Cole Bananas, broccoli, carrots, cucumber, lettuce, pears, tomatoes, washed potatoes, £16.50
white onions
Dairy Crest Data currently not available 
Riverford Basil, Swiss chard, bunched beet root, hispi cabbage, bunched carrots, celery, courgettes, £12.50
green batavia, lettuce, new potatoes, rocket, bunched turnips, onions, runner beans or 
French beans 
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14 Marketing for 'this week's box' (from www.riverford.co.uk)
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15 Marketing for Riverford Organic Vegetables Ltd
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16 Pictures of anthuriums, orchids and bromeliads
Exhibit x xxxxxxxxxxxxx17 Growth stages of an Anthurium plant
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Exhibit 18 Picture of the Chinese facility after laying the 
foundation stone
Exhibit x xxxxxxxxxxxxxExhibit 19 Open house at Landgut Nemt in June 2005
